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Twenty Years after the Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974:
Look Who's Running Now
Debra Burke*
I. Introduction
The more things change, the more they stay the same. In the late
1800s and early 1900s the Senate was considered to be a club of rich
men who were unresponsive to the needs of the people.1 This perceived
unresponsiveness, along with the distortion caused by wealth in the
political system, led to the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, which provided for the direct election of
Senators by the people2 instead of by state legislatures. Today,

nevertheless, over half of the Senators who serve in Congress are
millionaires, and no Senator prior to election earned anywhere near the
median level of personal income in the United States.' The Federal
Election Campaign Act Amendments of 19744 represent what is
probably the most comprehensive set of reforms to the electoral process
since the Seventeenth Amendment. Twenty years after the passage of
these amendments, however, the cry for more reform continues,
buttressed by the ever present appearance of the corrupting influence that
wealth has in elections. 5 In fact, the House Report on its latest reform
bill echoed the same concerns that prompted the 1974 amendments. The
report acknowledged that "the presumption of fairness has been seriously

*Associate Professor, Western Carolina University. Special thanks to Sylvia M. Dobray for her
administrative assistance in the preparation of this article, and to Shannon E. West for her assistance
in the research of this article.
1. Harold Leventhal, Courts and Political Thickets, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 345, 370-71 (1977).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XVR, § 1. The amendment provides, "[Tihe Senate of the United
States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six
years; and each Senator shall have one vote." Id.
3. Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 273, 289 (1993).
4. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1988)).
5. See generally Sanford Levinson, ElectoralRegulation: Some Comments, 18 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 411 (1989); Marilee Stephenson-Home, Comment, The Road to Hell - The Unintended
Consequences of Unwise Federal Campaign Finance Reforms, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547 (1990);
William M. Welch, Comment, The Federal Bribery Statute and Special Interest Campaign
Contributions, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1347 (1989). Reforms continue at the state level
as well. See generally Keon S. Chi, Financing State and Local Elections: Trends and Issues, in
THE BOOK OF THE STATES 283 (1992-93).
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eroded-both among the governed and their elected officials-by the
large sums of money raised and spent in today's elections ....
[A]s the
sense of legitimacy of our elections is eroded, so too is the fundamental
legitimacy of government itself."6 This article will examine the
historical development of the laws governing the electoral process and
the court decisions that have interpreted them. It also will discuss the
cry for more reform, focussing on the need for the public financing of
Congressional elections.
II. Historical Development of Laws Governing Elections
A. Early Reform Efforts
Campaign reform has been a part of the political agenda for
decades. In 1907, Congress passed the Tillman Act,7 which prohibited
chartered banks and corporations from making political contributions in
elections. The Act subsequently was amended to require the disclosure
of campaign contributions for House and Senate races. 8 However, in
Newberry v. United States9 the Supreme Court held that the amendments
to the act that regulated primary elections were unconstitutional."° Four
years later, in 1925, Congress passed the Federal Corrupt Practices
Act," which provided the first comprehensive treatment of the problem
of corruption in elections. The Act was limited to general election
activities and required the disclosure of contributions and expenditures
by candidates and political action committees (PACs). 2 Subsequently
in the 1940s, Congress further restricted the activities of PACs, along
with the political activities of federal employees, 3 and also banned
contributions from labor unions in federal elections."

6. H.R. RP. No. 375, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 29-30 (1993).
7. Act of January 26, 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b
(1988)).
8. Publicity Act of 1910, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822. The act was amended a year later to include
prenomination transactions. Act of Aug. 19, 1911, 37 Stat. 25.
9. 256 U.S. 232 (1924).
10. For a discussion of these early reform efforts see Stephenson-Home, supranote 5, at 54849.
11. Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, tit. I1, 43 Stat. 1053, 1070 (repealed
1972). The Act was upheld in Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
12. See PastActions By Congress Re Campaign Financing, 53 CONG. Dio. 36 (Feb. 1974).
The Act's effectiveness, however, seems dubious. No candidate ever was prosecuted under its
provisions. Hearings on Federal Election Reform Before the Senate Comm. on Rules and
Administration, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 205 (1973).
13. The Hatch Act Amendments, ch. 640, 54 Stat. 767 (1940) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 595 (1988)).
14. LaborManagementRelationsActof1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, 159 (codifiedat2U.S.C.
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The next major flurry of reform did not occur until the 1970s.
Growing concern over campaign practices led to the enactment of the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971."5 This legislation (1) repealed
the Corrupt Practices Act, (2) required the disclosure of contributions by
political committees of more than $1,000, (3) required the disclosure of

contributions by individuals in excess of $100, (4) limited expenditures
for use in the communications media, and (5) limited contributions and
expenditures from the candidate's personal funds.
In retrospect, the Act had several deficiencies. First, it repealed

prior prohibitions on contributions; as a result, a pattern of dependence
from wealthy individuals and special interest groups emerged that
disclosure requirements alone were unable to deter. 6 Second, the
expenditure limits of the 1971 Act applied only to the broadcast media,
so campaign budgets continued to expand in other areas.7 Lastly,
whether or not the requirements that the Act did impose could be
effectively enforced remained unclear. The disclosure requirements
resulted in a massive compilation of data. Unfortunately, while Congress
mandated a system of information gathering, it failed to create a structure
which could coherently act upon the data. i"

§ 441b (1988)). Although the constitutionality of the provisions subsequently was challenged, the
Court avoided the issue. See United States v. C.I.O., 335 U.S. 106 (1947); United States v.
U.A.W., 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
15. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as
amended in scattered parts of 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 etseq. (1988 & Supp. 1993). Although there were
concerted attempts during the debate on the Act to add language limiting contributions from
individuals, minority leaders, responding to fierce opposition from the Nixon White House,
threatened to veto the entire bill if such limitations were included. FinancingCampaigns: Growing
Pressurefor Reform, 31 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1877 (1973).
16. The Committee for the Re-Election of the President (Nixon) raised almost seventeen million
dollars from 124 contributors in chunks of more than $50,000 apiece. By 1974, all but ten percent
of the money going to federal candidates, political parties, and committees came from just one
percent of the population. For Congressional elections, just two to three percent of the nation's
wealthiest citizens provided ninety-five percent of the campaign funds. Robert 0. Tiernan, The
PresidentialCampaign:PublicFinancingAccepted, 69 NAT'L Civic REv. 133, 135 (March 1980).
Studies also revealed substantial contributions from special interest groups. See Hearingson Federal
Election CampaignAct of 1973 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 92 (1973) (report by Common Cause).
17. Prior to the 1972 election, the cost of campaigns at all levels of government had increased
nearly three hundred percent in just twenty years, more than five times the rate of inflation. In just
four years the total amount expended on elections had jumped from about three hundred million
dollars in 1968 to four hundred twenty-five million dollars in 1972. Tiernan, supranote 16, at 135.
18. The Senate version of the bill had provided for an independent elections committee to
monitor compliance with the reporting requirements. However, Representative Wayne Hays,
Chairman of the House Administration Committee, and a member of the conference committee
which reported the 1971 Act, adamantly opposed the creation of such a commission and insisted that
the provision for the independent commission be deleted. See HearingsBefore the Senate Comm.
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On the other hand, another bill passed by Congress that same year
proved to be a successful first step in campaign reform. A provision of
the Revenue Act of 197119 drove a wedge into the domain of private
financing of Presidential general elections by establishing the dollar
check-off on income tax returns, the proceeds of which were collected
into a Treasury fund for disbursement to candidates.2" Nevertheless,
the deficiencies of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, coupled
with the events associated with Watergate and the activities of the
Committee to Re-Elect the President, continued to produce demands

from many sectors for additional, more comprehensive, and enforceable
election reform.
In 1973 Congress considered several reform packages. The Senate
passed a bill that year which limited contributions from individuals,
capped expenditures in Congressional campaigns and transferred
substantive enforcement authority to an independent elections
The Senate also passed a joint resolution which
commission.2

on Rules andAdministration, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 190(1973). Consequently, enforcement authority
was vested in three co-equal supervisory officers: the Secretary of the Senate, the Clerk of the
House, and the Comptroller General. The Act mandated that these officers through ad hoc, informal
cooperation, investigate complaints and report apparent violations to the Department of Justice.
Skeptical of this arrangement, whereby the Secretary and the Clerk were charged with policing the
conduct of elected officials with whom they had substantial contact and who were responsible for
their selection, Common Cause decided that a lively citizen interest in enforcement was needed. It
monitored the degree of compliance with the Act, made public numerous violations, and filed
hundreds of complaints with the supervisory officers regarding incongruencies in filing. In the
course of its monitoring, it noted several shortcomings in the supervisory officers' performance.
Both the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House chose not to refer numerous violations
to the Department of Justice; they did not actively search for and investigate incomplete filings. The
most egregious performance, however, was rendered by the Department. In 1972 the Clerk
forwarded 4,900 complaints to the Department regarding improper filings, and the Department chose
to act on only three. Similarly the Secretary forwarded 565 cases. Only a handful were acted upon.
Hearingson Federal Election Reform Before the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections of the
Senate Comm. on Rules and Administration, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 83-88 (1973). In subsequent
hearings on campaign reform legislation, the Government Accounting Office (GAO), whose
comptroller had been given some investigatory responsibility under the 1971 Act, was supportive
of reforming the monitoring apparatus. Id. at 137.
19. Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497, 573 (codified at 26 U.S.C.
§ 6096). A similar subsidy had been established in 1966, but was repealed one year later.
Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-809, 80 Stat. 1587 (repealed
1967).
20. For further discussion of this provision see infra notes 35-39.
21. 119 CONG. REc. 26613 (1973) (voting on S. 372). In hearings on the reform bills
proposed that year there emerged three distinct areas of concern. First, the appropriate limitation
on campaign expenditures and individual contributions were debated. Frustrated because the
disclosure requirements of the 1971 Act failed to deter influential individuals and special interest
groups from bankrolling campaigns, the committee surveyed what would be desirable limits.
Second, the propriety of requiring each candidate to have one central campaign committee which
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proposed the establishment of a non-partisan, top level independent
commission in the nature of a task force to investigate election law
compliance and to make concrete suggestions for reform.' The House,
however, failed to take any action that year on election reform. 23 Even
though the first session of the ninety-third Congress failed to produce any
results,' the debate that year suggested that reform was inevitable.

B. The 1974 Reforms
Ultimately, the second session of the ninety-third Congress produced
the comprehensive reform measures of the Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendments of 1974.
Early in the session the Senate reported
the bill that formed the basis of the 1974 Amendments.26 The bill, as

would be responsible for reporting to the monitoring authority was debated. Concern was voiced
that multiple finance committees obscured the realities of who actually made the donation. Third,
the hearings examined the appropriate composition of an independent elections committee and the
appropriate range of its enforcement powers. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Rules and
Administration, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 163-274 (1973). Other hearings that year examined the
disparate treatment afforded the broadcast media under the 1971 Act. Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Communicationsofthe Senate Committee on Commerce, 93d Cong., I st Sess. 132-207
(1973). The final bill as passed differed from the reported bill in that it further reduced expenditure
limits and the ceiling on individual contributions in congressional elections. See S. REP. No. 310,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
22. S.J. Res. 110, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The modest resolution was proposed by
President Nixon who was an opponent of comprehensive reform measures. President's Remarks
upon Transmitting to the Congress Proposed Legislation to Establish a Non-Partisan Commission
on Federal Election Reform, 9 Wkly. Comp. of Pres. Doe. 675 (May 16, 1973).
23. A bill also was introduced in the House that called for limitations on individual
contributions and a limited form of public financing of Congressional elections based on a matching
grant formula. H.R. 7612, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). Hearings were held on the proposed
measures. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Elections of the House Comm. on House
Administration, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-95 (1973); HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on Rules and
Administration, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 155-288 (1973). However, no action was taken.
24. Campaign financing, of course, is of vital importance to any elected official. A perverse
form of institutional patriotism may explain why Congress is often reluctant to increase the selfregulation of its members. See generally DAVID J. VOLGER, THE POLITICS OF CONGRESS 238
(1977).
25. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(1974) (codified in part as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1988)).
26. S. REP. No. 689, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). As reported, S. 3044 provided public funds
for Congressional candidates in primaries on a matching basis, and full funding for major party
candidates in general elections, all to be raised by doubling the existing tax check-off provisions.
It also doubled the then existing tax deductions and credits to encourage small, private political
contributions. The bill limited expenditures for primary campaigns to ten cents per voter, and for
general elections, fifteen cents per voter. Individual contributions were limited to $3,000 for each
primary and each general election, while individual groups could spend no more than $1,000 to
advocate the election of any one candidate. It also called for each candidate to establish a central
campaign committee for reporting purposes and established an independent Federal Election
Commission. Id.
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modified on the floor of the Senate,27 passed after lengthy and
passionate debate.2" The bill reported by committee to the House was
more narrow than its Senate counterpart,29 and was passed by the House
virtually as reported.' Eventually the Conference Committee resolved
the 138 points of difference between the two bills. Some Senators
pressed hard for public financing of congressional elections, but agreed
to drop the issue in exchange for increased spending limits for House and
Senate campaigns, and a stronger independent elections commission
composed of an eight member bipartisan, full time supervisory board
controlled by six voting public members with the Senate Secretary and
House Clerk as ex-officio members.31 The compromise passed both

27. By unanimous consent the Senate dropped Title V which would have doubled the tax checkoff, preferring that the Finance Committee examine the proposal first. 120 CONG. REC. 8466
(1974). Other major revisions included a twenty percent reduction in the federal subsidy for primary
and general election campaigns. Id. at 10339. Separate limits on contributions to primaries and
general elections were also eliminated in favor of the imposition of an overall contribution limit of
$3,000 for individuals and $6,000 for organizations. Id. at 10549.
28. During the bill's consideration, Senator James Allen, a conservative from Alabama,
launched a filibuster by amendment in consort with other southern Democrats and conservative
Republicans. Cloture was successfully invoked by a one vote margin after a bipartisan group of
Senators conducted an extensive lobbying effort. Senate Passes Campaign Reform Bill With Public
Funding. 32 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 927 (1974). Common Cause supported their effort by running
advertisements in the Washington Post in which they revealed figures on the amounts of money that
special interest groups had already amassed for the 1974 Congressional elections, and specifically
singled out members of Congress who had received large special interest contributions in the past.
Id. Additionally, the League of Women Voters and some labor leaders made phone calls to key
Senators to persuade them to vote for cloture. Campaign Reform: Public Financing Faces House
Test, 32 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1210, 1212 (1974). The bill survived a last minute attempt by
Senator Allen to recommit and finally passed by a vote of 53-32. 120 CONG. REc. 10952 (1974).
29. It limited individual expenditures on behalf of a candidate to $1,000 per year. It limited
expenditures by candidates to $10 million in primaries and $20 million in general elections for
Presidential campaigns, $75,000 or five cents per vote in Senatorial campaigns, and $75,000 in
House races. The bill included full public financing under the presidential campaign check-off for
presidential general elections and national party nominating conventions, and allowed federal
matching grants for presidential primaries. It required that all candidates establish a central
campaign committee for reporting purposes and established a seven member board of supervisory
officers, possessed with substantive enforcement powers, to monitor the reporting. This Board,
which included the Secretary of the Senate, the Clerk of the House, and the Comptroller General,
along with four public members appointed by the Congressional leadership, did not resemble the
Senate's more independent election commission. H. REP. No. 1239, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)
(H.R. 16090).
30. 120 CONG. REc. 27513 (1974). The full House did lower the spending limit to $60,000
for House races. Id. at 27468. The only other significant change reflected a compromise reached
earlier whereby the four public members of the Board were given control, the Comptroller General
dropped, and the Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the House were made ex-offlcio, non-voting
members. Id. at 27473. See generally House Approves Campaign FinancingReforms, 32 CONG.
Q. WKLY. REP. 2192 (1974).

31.

Campaign FinancingReform, 32 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2691 (1974).
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chambers32 and became law,33 representing the greatest reform in the
electoral process since the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment.
In sum, the Act (1) limited contributions from individuals to $1,000
and contributions by committees to $5,000 for each election campaign of
a candidate, (2) limited individual expenditures on behalf of a candidate
to $1,000 per year, (3) limited expenditures from a candidate's personal
funds to $50,000 for Presidential or Vice-Presidential candidates,
$35,000 for Senatorial candidates, and $25,000 for most candidates for
the House, and (4) imposed overall expenditure limits of $10 million for
Presidential primaries and $20 million for Presidential elections,
$100,000 or eight cents per voter for Senate primaries, and $150,000 or
twelve cents per voter for Senate general elections, and $70,000 for
House primaries and general elections. 4 Ironically, the two parts of
the Act for which the public financing of Congressional elections was
sacrificed in conference, increased expenditure limits and the composition
of the supervisory commission, were both ruled unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo.35
The Act also established a statutory scheme for the full funding of
Presidential elections, the partial funding of Presidential primaries, and
the funding of national party nominating conventions. 36 The 1974
Amendments expanded the public financing of Presidential general
elections initiated by the Revenue Act of 1971 by providing for
(1) public funding of up to two million dollars for national party
nominating conventions, and (2) matching public funds in presidential
primaries of up to $5 million per candidate for candidates who met a
fund raising requirement of $100,000 raised in amounts of at least
$5,000 in each of twenty states through contributions of $250 or less.37
Under current law, major party candidates, those who received twenty-

32. The conference compromise quickly passed the House. 120 CONG. REc. 34385 (1974).
Some opposition was voiced in the Senate over the low spending limits, but the chamber approved
it. Id. at 35148.
33. At the signing ceremony President Ford expressed some reservations about the public
financing title, but claimed that he had heard "from the American people in writing and in other
communications that they want this legislation." The President's Remarks at the Bill Signing
Ceremony at the White House, 10 Wkly. Comp. of Pres. Doc. 1285 (Oct. 15, 1974). As
representative of his constituency and in the "spirit of cooperation and compromise," President Ford
signed into law the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974. See id.
34. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(1974) (codified in part as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1988)).
35. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). For a more comprehensive discussion of this casesee infra notes 43-61
and accompanying text.
36. 26 U.S.C. § 9001-42 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
37. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9008, 9033 (1988). See generally Joseph Biden, Public Financing of
Elections, 69 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 38 (1974).
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five percent of the popular vote in the previous election, are entitled to
receive equal payments not to exceed the expenditure limitations. 8
Minor party candidates, those who received between five and twenty-five

percent of the vote in the previous Presidential election, can be funded
in the same proportion to the major party subsidy as its previous popular
vote bears to the average popular vote of the major parties.39 Receipt
of public funding is conditioned upon the candidate limiting expenditures
to ten million dollars in the primary elections and twenty million dollars
in the general election. '
Moreover, participating major party
candidates may not accept private contributions, and minor party
candidates may accept private contributions only up to the limit of the
major party funding."
Since these 1974 amendments, only limited reform measures have
been enacted. In 1976 Congress addressed the constitutional objections
of the Court in Buckley, and also specifically allowed corporations and
labor organizations to establish segregated funds to be used for political
purposes. 42 The amendments passed in 1979 removed certain local
party activities from the definitions of contribution and expenditure,
which were previously covered by the 1974 Amendments, 43 and
specifically restricted the conversion of campaign funds for personal use
upon retirement.' These various acts of Congress alone, however, are
not wholly responsible for the present electoral system. The Supreme
Court in evaluating the constitutionality of these legislative enactments,
particularly the 1974 amendments, has dramatically affected the degree
to which reforms have been successfully implemented.

38. 26 U.S.C. § 9004(a) (1988).
39. Id. See generally Campaign Financing Reform 32 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2691 (1974).
The 1974 amendments deleted the provision of the 1971 Revenue Act that allowed the taxpayer to
designate the party to be credited as well. For a discussion of this and other changes made by the
act see generally Larry D. McCoy, Recent Reforms and Their Consequences, 2 POL'Y STUD. J. 242
(Summer 1974).
40. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(b)(1) (1988). Such a limitation on expenditures is constitutional providing
it is accompanied by public funding. See infra note 129 and accompanying text. Since the
enactment of these provisions, every presidential election since 1976 has been financed with public
funds and only two major candidates, John Connally and Ross Perot, have refused public funds.
See Joseph Michael Pace, Public Funding of Presidential Campaigns and Elections: Is There a
Viable Future?, 24 PRES. STUD. Q. 139, 141-43 (Wint. 1994).
41. 26 U.S.C. § 9003 (1988). Expenditures from a candidate's personal funds are limited to
$50,000 for each election. Id. §§ 9004(d), 9035 (1988).
42. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475,
490 (as codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (1993)).
43. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339
(1980) (codified in scattered sections at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1988)).
44. 2 U.S.C. § 439a (1988 & Supp. 1993).
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III. The Judicial Gloss
A. Buckley v. Valeo and Its Progeny
In Buckley v. Valeo, 5 the Supreme Court ruled that the First
Amendment's protection of free speech required the invalidation of
several provisions of the 1974 Act. The Court struck down the Act's (1)
ceiling on expenditures by individuals not in consort with a candidate's
official campaign, (2) its limitation on a candidate's expenditures from
personal funds, and (3) its ceilings on overall expenditures in nonsubsidized Congressional races. 4" The Court, however, found the
contribution limitations to be an appropriate exercise of Congressional
regulatory power that did not unconstitutionally infringe upon the
protected First Amendment rights of association47 or speech.4" It
found that such restrictions were constitutionally justified by the Act's
primary purpose, which was "to limit the actuality and appearance of
corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions.""
In contrast, the Court held that the Act's expenditure ceilings
unconstitutionally imposed "direct and substantial restraints on the
quantity of political speech."' The Court found that an individual's
expenditures in support of a candidate constituted protected speech, and
that "advocacy of the election or defeat of candidates for federal office
is no less entitled to protection under the First Amendment than the
discussion of political policy generally or advocacy of the passage or
defeat of legislation."51 The Court also held that the expenditures by
candidates themselves facilitated their own political speech and were not
akin to a contribution.52 So characterized, the restriction on personal

45. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), rev'g inpart, aff'g in pan, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (en banc). The per curiam opinion constituted 294 pages with five separate opinions being
filed. For a discussion of the case see Leventhal, supra note 1, at 356-67.
46. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 59 (1976).
47. While admitting that the contribution ceilings limited one important means of associating
with a candidate or committee, the Court reasoned that the ceilings, nevertheless, left the contributor
free to become a member of any political association and to assist that association on behalf of
candidates. Id. at 22.
48. Although it acknowledged the communicative aspects of contributions, the Court reasoned
that such aspects did not increase with the amount of the contribution, since the expression rested
on the symbolic act of contributing. Id. at 23.
49. Id. at 26.
50. Id. at 39.
51. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48.
52. Id. at 52, n.58. Justice Marshall, however, argued that a limit on a candidate's personal
expenditures was equivalent to a contribution limitation, and, as such, was constitutionally
permissible. Id. at 287-88 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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expenditures by candidates unconstitutionally restricted their freedom to
speak on behalf of their own candidacy, at least in non-federally
subsidized elections. 3 Furthermore, the Court concluded that the cap
on aggregate expenditures in non-subsidized Congressional elections was
unconstitutional as well, reasoning that the interest in equalizing the

financial resources of candidates did not justify restricting the scope of
federal election campaigns.With respect to other issues raised, the Court upheld the validity of
the disclosure requirements, finding them to be a permissible mandate
which did not facially infringe upon associational rights.55 The Court

also upheld the public funding scheme for Presidential elections, finding
that the system did not invidiously discriminate against candidates of nonmajor parties nor abridge speech, but rather used public funds to
facilitate and enlarge public discussions.' On the other hand, the Court
found the composition of the Federal Election Commission to be an
unconstitutional delegation of authority to individuals who were not
"officers of the United States." 57
The Court severed the
unconstitutional provisions from the Act' and allowed the remaining
provisions to become effective.59 Congress subsequently amended the
Act'u to bring the composition of the Commission into conformity with
the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.6 1 In sum, the most
significant holding in Buckley with respect to election reform was the
differentiation between campaign contributions and expenditures' and

53. Id. at 54.
54. Id. at 56.
55. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74.
56. Id. at 90-108.
57. Id. at 99.
58. Id. at 140-43.
59. Id. at 108.
60. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 101(3), 90
Stat. 475, 476 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437c (1988)). The Act as amended provides for the
Presidential appointment of all members, subject to Congressional approval.
61. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
2. The Appointments Clause provides in pertinent part that
the President shall nominate, and with the Senate's advice and consent, appoint all "Officers of the
United States," whose appointments are not otherwise provided for, but that Congress may vest the
appointment of such inferior officers, as it deems proper, in the President alone, in the courts, or
in the heads of departments.
62. Justice Blackman saw no constitutional distinction between expenditure limitations and
contribution limitations. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 290 (Blackman, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Both he and Chief Justice Burger would have struck down both limitations. In a later
decision Justice White also determined that the distinction had no constitutional significance. See
FEC v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 519 (1985) (White, J., dissenting). For a
discussion of the Buckley Court's distinction see Samuel M. Taylor, Note, Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce: Addressing a New Corruption in Campaign Financing, 69 N.C. L. REv.
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the conclusion that while contributions could be limited by Congress,
expenditures were too close to the essence of speech in a modern society,
and could not be limited any more than speech itself could be limited
legislatively.63
In subsequent decisions the Court further illuminated the scope of
permissible election regulations in light of First Amendment concerns.
The Court affirmed a lower court's ruling that the spending limits
imposed by the 1974 amendments upon a presidential candidate who
accepts federal funds did not violate the First Amendment rights of
candidates nor of supporters.'
Subsequently, however, the Court in
FederalElection Commission v. National Conservative PAC65 held that
the $1,000 limitation that the 1974 amendments imposed on expenditures
by individuals in support of presidential candidates who accept public
funds was unconstitutional. The Court stated, "There can be no doubt
that the expenditures at issue in this case produce speech at the core of
the First Amendment."' It rationalized that forbidding the expenditure
of more than $1,000 to present political views was like "allowing a
speaker in a public hall to express his views while denying him the use
of an amplifying system."67
After concluding that the PAC's
expenditures were entitled to full First Amendment protection,' the
Court followed Buckley and found that neither corruption nor the
appearance of corruption justified the limit because such uncoordinated
expenditures did not have the same tendency to corrupt as direct
contributions.' The Court also refused to adopt a narrow-construction
of the prohibition and limit its application to wealthy PACs in order to
save the provision.7"
In a subsequent decision, the Court upheld a restriction on
independent expenditures made by corporations. In Austin v. Michigan

1060, 1066-67 (1991).
63. For a critique of the Court's equating of money with speech see infra notes 76-117 and
accompanying text.
64. Republican Nat'l Comm. v. FEC, 445 U.S. 955 (1980) (memorandum opinion), aff'g, 487
F. Supp 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (three judge district court panel).
65. Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480 (1985), aff'g
in part, rev'g in part, 578 F. Supp. 797 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
66. Id. at 493.
67. Id. The court also observed that freedom of association under the First Amendment was
squarely implicated by the restriction. Id. at 494.
68. Id. at 496.
69. Id. at 497. The court concluded that an exchange of political favors for uncoordinated
expenditures was only "a hypothetical possibility and nothing more." Id. at 498.
70. FEC v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 498.
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Chamber of Commerce7 the Court upheld a Michigan law that
prohibited corporations from making independent expenditures in state
elections unless such expenditures were made from a segregated fund for
political purposes. The Court determined that, because the segregated
fund requirement burdened expressive activity, it had to be justified by
a compelling state interest.72 In finding that interest the Court
enunciated a new constitutional justification for election regulations, the
state interest in combatting "the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth." 7 3 The Court noted, however, that a
corporation's accumulation of wealth alone did not justify the regulation,
but rather that the "unique state-conferred corporate structure that
facilitates the amassing of large treasuries warrants the limit on
individual expenditures. " ' In an earlier decision, Federal Election
Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.," the Court had
76
held that a federal prohibition similar to the one at issue in Austin
77
could not be constitutionally applied to a nonprofit corporation.
B. A Callfor Reconsideration
The precedents set by Buckley and some of its progeny with respect
to the unconstitutionality of restrictions on independent expenditures have
been criticized, and a re-examination has been urged. 78 Even the Court

71. 494 U.S. 652 (1990), rev'g, 856 F.2d 783 (6th Cir. 1988), aff'g, 643 F. Supp. 397 (W.D.
Mich. 1986). For a comprehensive analysis of this case see David Cole, FirstAmendmentAntitrust:
The End of Laisse-Fairein CampaignFinance, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 236 (1991); Taylor, supra
note 60.
72. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990). In an earlier
decision, the Court had extended first amendment protection to corporate speech. First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (holding that state statute prohibiting corporate
spending to influence outcome of a referendum was unconstitutional). For an excellent discussion
of corporate political speech and the First Amendment see Michael J. Garrison, CorporatePolitical
Speech, Campaign Spending, and FirstAmendment Doctrine, 27 AM. Bus. L.J. 163 (1989).
73. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
74. Id.
75. 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (plurality opinion).
76. Like the Michigan prohibition the federal statute prohibits corporate campaign contributions
to political candidates but excepts from the prohibition contributions to a segregated fund established
for the purpose of contributing to candidates. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1988). The federal act also limits
the solicitations of contributions to stockholders or members of a corporation without capital stock.
That restriction was upheld in FEC v. Nat'l Right To Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
77. The court found that the MCFL's publication and distribution violated federal law. FEC
v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. at 251. However, the court also found that the
prohibition could not constitutionally be applied to the nonprofit corporation because it (1) was
formed to promote a political idea, (2) had no shareholders or persons with a claim on its assets, and
(3) was not established as a conduit for the ideas of either a corporation for profit or a labor union.
Id. at 263-64.
78. See Leventhal, supra note 1 at 382; Raskin, supra note 3, at 315-330. See also J. Skelly
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in Buckley acknowledged that the possibility remained open for a reexamination if the justifications for such restrictions became more
compelling in the future.79 Arguably the caps on PAC and individual
contributions that were upheld in Buckley have caused funds to be
channeled into individual expenditures.'m It seems quite fanciful to
believe that these expenditures will go unnoticed by candidates, and
hence will not exert any corrupting influence, 8 or that these
expenditures are totally uncoordinated since often candidates and
In logical contrast to the
committees share political consultants.'
Buckley Court's conclusion, expenditures of significant sums can not only
unduly influence the outcome of elections but can also influence the
views of candidates themselves. Otherwise the expenditures would not
be made. Moreover, when the Court upheld the right of a candidate to
expend unlimited personal funds, it may not have contemplated a
candidate such as Ross Perot.'
Congress obviously felt that independent expenditures had the
potential to corrupt the electoral process when it limited such
expenditures in 1974. In this particular niche, who better to judge?
Justice White, a former campaign coordinator for President Kennedy,
argued in Buckley that the expenditure limitations were an appropriate
exercise of Congressional power to regulate elections under the
Constitution.' He concluded that the purposes of the restrictions, that
Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political
Equality?,82 COLuM. L. REV. 609 (1982); David K. Neidert, Comment, Campaign Reform: Fifteen
Years After Buckley v. Valeo, 17 J. CONTEMP. L. 289 (1991). But see Austin v. Michigan Chamber
of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 683 (1990) (Scalia, J. dissenting) ("Buckley v. Valeo should not be
overruled because it is entirely correct.").
79. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46 (1976). Justice White, who dissented from the holding
that restrictions on independent expenditures were unconstitutional, has subsequently argued that
PAC expenditures, coupled with the growth in public concern over the integrity of the election
system, now more than ever may constitute sufficiently compelling justifications for the restrictions.
See FEC v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 510 (1985) (White, J., dissenting). But see Roy
A. Schotland, ProposalsFor Campaign FinanceReform - Postscript, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 489,
498-99 (1992) (claiming that effect on elections by independent expenditures not significant).
80. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 510-12 (White, J., dissenting).
81. Justice Stevens concluded that corporate expenditures might create an appearance of
corruption which would justify state regulation of both expenditures and contributions. Austin, 494
U.S. at 678 (Stevens, J. concurring).
82. Stephenson-Home, supra note 5, at 556 n.60.
83. Perot spent $60 million of his own money in an effort to become the forty-second
President. Raskin, supra note 3, at 329. For a discussion of the objections to allowing unlimited
expenditures of personal funds by candidates see also Jonathan M. Rich, Campaign Finance
Legislation: Equality and Freedom, 20 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 409, 422-26 (1986).
84. The Constitution provides that "[Tlhe Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing
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is, supporting the limitations on direct contributions, eliminating the
appearance of corruption, maintaining public confidence in the electoral
process, equalizing the resources available to candidates, and keeping the
overall amount of money devoted to campaigning at a reasonable level,
were all legitimate, substantial, and more than sufficient to override the
burden imposed upon speech.'
He warned that severing the
expenditure provisions would undermine the scheme Congress had
crafted because the effectiveness of the limits on contributions depended
upon the existence of limits on independent expenditures.6
Nevertheless, although legislative enactments enjoy a presumption of
constitutionality," and although the Court deferred to Congress with
respect to other parts of its plan,' it concluded that the Constitution
forbids such deference with respect to the expenditure limitations.
The primary underlying proposition that led to this conclusion was
the Court's decision to equate expenditures of money with speech, that
is, to canonize the proposition that money talks. As previously noted,
the Court stated that independent expenditures produce core First
Amendment speech. However, as Justice White asserted, producing
speech is not the same as speech itself.89 He argued that "[t]he First
Amendment protects the right to speak, not the right to spend, and
limitations on the amount of money that can be spent are not the same
as restrictions on speaking."'° Money may facilitate speech, but it is
not communicative itself.9 Spending money is better characterized as

Senators." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
85. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 257-66 (White, J. dissenting). See also National Conservative PAC,
470 U.S. at 509-12 (White, J., dissenting).
86. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 261-62 (White, J. dissenting). See also NationalConservative PAC,
470 U.S. at 518 (White, J. dissenting).
87. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (upholding conviction under criminal statute
that prohibited advocating overthrow of government by violence). Of course, legislation that inhibits
political freedoms must survive more exacting judicial scrutiny. United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
88. For example, the Court deferred to the choices of Congress with respect to the thresholds
for the disclosure requirements, as well as to its Presidential campaign funding plan. Buckley, 424
U.S. at 83, 100.
89. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 508 (White, J., dissenting). Other commentators
have reached the same conclusion. See J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money
Speech? 85 YALE L.J. 1002 (1976); Kenneth J. Levit, Note, Campaign FinanceReform and the
Return of Buckley v. Valeo, 103 YALE L.J. 469, 496-97 (1993).
90. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 508 (White, J., dissenting).
91. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 259 (White, J., dissenting). One commentator has argued that if
money equaled speech, bribery laws should be unconstitutional. Raskin, supra note 3, at 320.
"Yet, speech is defined in such a way as to exclude the personal corruption of elected officials.
Why, then, should it not be defined in such a way as to exclude the systematic corruption of the
political process by private wealth?" Raskin, supra note 3, at 320.
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conduct,' and as such, regulations of expenditures should be subject to
a less exacting standard of judicial review than those regulating pure
If a citizen desired to support a candidate and was without
speech.'
financial means, that citizen would volunteer time. That time could be
spent canvassing the neighborhood, anchoring a phone bank, handing out
leaflets, or on any other activity that clearly involves the citizen's
conduct. Money, then, is merely a less active surrogate for citizens of
means to perform such services. However, because time is finite and
money for those citizens of substantial means seems much less limited,
actual participation in the electoral process can be skewed if money is
equated with speech constitutionally.
Expenditure limits in fact may increase constitutional and democratic
principles by allowing citizens an equal voice in the marketplace of
Without such limits, citizens of means may dominate the
ideas.'
elections process by the magnitude of their wealth, and not by the
Just as regulations of the economic
strength of their ideas.9 5
marketplace preclude monopolistic behavior, so should regulations in the
However, the Supreme Court in
political marketplace of ideas.'

92. The appeals court characterized the expenditures provisions at issue in Buckley as
regulating conduct, not speech. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F. 2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975). However, that
rationale was rejected by the Supreme Court. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15-16.
93. Government regulations restricting speech are subject to a rigorous standard of review.
Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 500-01. A regulation restricting conduct, on the other hand,
is justified if (1) it is within the constitutional power of the government, (2) it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest, (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression, and (4) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
Sometimes it is difficult to discern between conduct and symbolic speech. See e.g., Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (burning the American flag); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405
(1974) (displaying defaced flag); Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969) (wearing black arm bands).
94. That free expression enhances the social good has been presumed for hundreds of years.
See generally JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGrTICA (1644); John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in 25 ThE
HARVARD CLASSICS 203-325 (Charles W. Eliot ed., 1909). The phrase marketplace of ideas was
coined by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
95. See Wright, supra note 76, at 632-42. Wealth may not only influence the marketplace of
ideas, but the marketplace of candidates as well, since access to that marketplace is becoming
increasingly dependent upon money. Wright, supra note 76, at 621.
96. Wright, supra note 76, at 636. See also Herbert Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in A
CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE 82-117 (1969) (certain views may have to be mooted to achieve true
freedom); Jerome Barron, Access to the Press -A New FirstAmendment Right, 80 HARv. L. REV.
1641 (1967) (government intervention may be necessary to assure access to the media); Gary S.
Stein, The FirstAmendment and Campaign FinanceReform: A Timely Reconciliation, 44 RUTGERS
L. REV. 743 (1992) (inadequately regulated campaign finance practices can subvert integrity of
political process).
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Buckley expressly rejected these arguments, emphasizing instead that "the

concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign
to the First Amendment. "'
It also rejected arguments which
analogized the restrictions to reasonable time, place, and manner
regulations." Although the loud and raucous noise made by sound
trucks can be regulated," apparently the noise made by money not only

must be tolerated, but any limitation on certain expenditures is viewed
as denying the speaker the use of a constitutionally necessary amplifying
system."t° The Court in a footnote in Buckley drew its own analogy,
stating that "[b]eing free to engage in unlimited political expression
subject to a ceiling on expenditures is like being free to drive an
automobile as far and as often as one desires on a single tank of
gasoline."' 0 '
However, such reasoning seems faulty because it
presumes one car and one driver. The key issue is not the total miles
per tank but the total miles driven on all tanks. If caps on expenditures
increase the number of candidates or voices that can be heard, then more
miles will be driven and more ideas explored." ° Furthermore, has
experience even hinted that the voluntary limits on expenditures by
Presidential candidates who accept public funds has eroded the quantity
of speech?0 3

97. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) See also Garrison, supra note 70, at 168-74
(regulation would stifle the open debate essential to the purpose of the first amendment); Stephen
E. Gottlieb, The Dilemma of Election CampaignFinanceReform, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 213 (1989)
(open competitive model of electoral campaigns is superior to an insulated or restricted one); Martin
Shapiro, Corruption,FreedomandEquality, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 385 (1989) (freedom may require
regulation but caution should be taken when elected representatives author the rules that determine
the outcome of elections).
98. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 17-18(1976). The government may place reasonable time, place and
manner restrictions on protected speech, provided such restrictions are content neutral. Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). See also Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505
(1993).
99. The principle case relied on for the analogy is Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), in
which the court upheld the community's regulation of loud and raucous sound trucks. Some
commentators, however, support the validity of this analogy. See Raskin, supra note 3, at 322-23;
Wright, supra note 76, at 639.
100. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
101. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 n.18.
102. As Justice White suggested, limiting the amount which can be spent would ease the
candidate's fundraising activities, and commensurately, free time for a greater discussion of the
issues. Id. at 265 (White, J. dissenting).
103. The factual assertion that limits on spending restrict the number of issues discussed is one
without factual support. Leventhal, supra note 1, at 359-60.
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The Court has justified restrictions on corporate speech by
rationalizing that, since the state facilitates the amassing of large
treasuries through its sanctioning of the corporate structure, the state can
forestall unfair deployment of wealth by corporations and its potential
unfair effect in the political marketplace."°4 Nevertheless, the only way
individuals may accumulate and retain wealth is through the protection
of laws, laws which govern business, employment, taxation and estate
planning. Private accumulation of wealth is no less a function of the
state than corporate accumulation; consider the experiences of the former
Soviet bloc nations. Why, then, is Congress prohibited from regulating
the perception of any unfair advantage caused by the loud voices of
individuals, and the potential deleterious effect on the marketplace of
ideas? 5
What the Constitution protects in the marketplace of ideas is the
right to join together for the advancement of beliefs and ideas."°
What the Constitution guarantees is that debate on public issues will be
uninhibited, robust, and wide open."
Such ideals are not
unconstitutionally compromised if the debate in the marketplace of
personalities is limited; individuals and PACs can still use unlimited
resources to champion their beliefs, their ideas, and their views in the
debate on public issues."
Why should the Constitution protect the
right of groups and individuals to be paternalistic to voters and steer
them to the appropriate candidate? As long as the issues are openly
debated with no restrictions on the amount of money devoted to that end,
then voters, not wealthy individuals or PACs, should be responsible for
educating themselves on who supports their own beliefs, ideas and views.
The only real speech per candidate should be every citizen's equal and
untainted vote. Even though restrictions on the context of speech are

104. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text. See also FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens
for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 258-59 (1986) (availability of resources in the treasury may make a
corporation a formidable political presence which in no way reflects the power of its ideas).
105. Neither Justice Kennedy nor Justice Scalia can discern the constitutional distinction between
expenditures by corporations and those by individuals, although both Justices would not allow a
limitation on expenditures by either party. Austin v. Michigan, 494 U.S. 652, 679-85, 695-707
(1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting and Kennedy, J., dissenting).
106. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
107. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
108. The Buckley Court rejected this distinction, concluding instead that candidates were
inextricably tied to public issues involving legislative proposals and governmental actions. Buckley,
424 U.S. at 42-45.
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especially pernicious and constitutionally suspect, t° expenditure
limitations remain content neutral and should be constitutional.' 10
Moreover, with today's Madison Avenue gloss on political
advertisements, some independent expenditures on candidate advocacy
more closely resemble commercial speech than political expression,"'
but, of course, not so closely so as to enjoy less First Amendment
protection.'
Nevertheless, there has been recent debate with respect
to the regulation of manipulative, negative political advertising"' and

109. See, e.g., Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (ordinance which
banned all peaceful picketing except that involving labor matters was unconstitutional); R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 112 S" Ct. 2538 (1992) (hate crime law cannot single out racist speech for
punishment); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Board, 112
S. Ct. 501 (1991) (Son of Sam law unconstitutionally imposes a financial burden on speakers
because of the content of their speech).
110. Leventhal, supra note 1, at 259. The Buckley Court recognized that the public financing
system of Presidential campaigns did not violate principles of government neutrality. Buckley, 424
U.S. at 92-93. Furthermore, expenditure limitations are only based upon the subject matter of the
speech and are not viewpoint based, and, as such, are more tolerable. FEC v. Nat'l Conservative
PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 509 (White, J., dissenting); R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2561 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). See also Note, Content Regulation and the Dimensions of FreeExpression, 96 HARv.
L. REV. 1854, 1863 (1983) (content regulation is a problem of reconciling competing interests in
expression).
111. Most commentators and legal scholars, of course, are understandably reluctant to
characterize any political speech as being commercial. Robert M. O'Neil, Regulating Speech to
Cleanse Political Campaigns, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 575 (1992); Danny Q. Boggs, Comment on the
PaperBy ProfessorO'Neil, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 593 (1992). See also Discovery Network, Inc. v.
City of Cincinnati, 946 F.2d 464 (6th Cir. 1991), aff'd 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993) (any effort to
distinguish political speech on the grounds of its commercial characteristics must be narrowly
circumscribed); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 698 (1990) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (advertisement at issue is a paradigm of political speech); Business Executives Move
for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd sub nom, CBS v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (cursory spot editorial advertisements are protected by the First
Amendment).
112. Commercial speech is not entitled to full First Amendment protection and regulation of it
by the State may be more easily justified. See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism
Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 340 (1986); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service
Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assoc., 436 U.S. 447,
455-56 (1978). Commercial speech is defined as that which proposes a commercial transaction.
Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1989); Pittsburgh Press
Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973).
113. Compare G.W. Hogan, FederalRepublic of Germany, Ireland, and the United Kingdom:
Three EuropeanApproaches to PoliticalCampaignRegulation, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 501 (1992) with
Francis X. Beytagh, Regulation of Election Campaigns in Europe and the U.S.: A Reprise to
Professor Hogan, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 545 (1992). See also Mark S. Mellman, Negative Ads,
PresidentialDebates and Positive PoliticianDiscourse, 8 J.L. & PouTICS 271, 273 (negative ads
are more likely to be based on true facts). Some observers advocate the employment of citizen
groups to monitor and critique publicly negative ad campaigns. Brian A. Freeman, Regulating
Campaign Advertising: Is There a Role for Citizen "Watchdogs"?, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 599, 609
(1992).
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the arguably too little, too late cure under libel law." 4 Of course in
the marketplace of ideas, the public has the right to receive
information," 5 and in that marketplace the answer to bad speech is
more accurate and complete speech. 116 However, advertisements
purchased through independent expenditures are less subject to selfpolicing reputational concerns than those claims made by the media or
by candidates; this should be a factor considered in balancing First
Amendment concerns.
The court has not been hostile to restrictions on political speech in7
every instance. For example, in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights"
the Court held that a city which operated a public rapid transit system
and sold advertising space was not required to accept paid political
advertising on behalf of a candidate for public office." 8 The Court
determined that "the managerial decision to limit car card space to
innocuous and less controversial commercial and service oriented
advertising does not rise to the dignity of a First Amendment
violation.""'
Perhaps in the future the Court will find that the
Congressional decision to limit expenditures in order to deter the
appearance of corruption and equalize the voices in the marketplace of
ideas does not rise to the dignity of a First Amendment violation either,
particularly in light of the continuing need for reform.
IV. Election Reform: Suggestions and Practical Justifications
A. The Continuing Need for Reform
Reform in the electoral process is still needed for several reasons.
As Justice White accurately predicted in Buckley: "Without limits on

114. Some manipulative, negative advertising may not be subject to the New York Times actual
malice test. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964). For example, an
opponent allegedly made the following statement in campaigning against an incumbent before an
unsophisticated audience, "Are you aware that Claude Pepper is known all over Washington as a
shameless extrovert? Not only that, but this man is reliably reported to practice nepotism with his
sister-in-law, and he has a sister, who was once a thespian in wicked New York. Worst of all, it
is an established fact that Mr. Pepper, before his marriage, practiced celibacy." ROBERT SHERRILL,
GOTHIC POLITICS IN THE DEEP SoUTH 150 (1968).
115. See e.g., Virginia St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 555, 764 (1980); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
116. O'Neil, supra note 109, at 591.
117. 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality opinion).
118. The proposed advertisement stated that, "Harry J. Lehman is old fashioned: About
Honesty, Integrity, and Good Government. State Representative - District 56 lx] Harry J.
Lehman." Id. at 299.
119. Idat3O4.
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campaign costs will inevitable and endlessly

escalate. "12
Since the Buckley decision, campaign expenses in
congressional elections have increased far beyond the rate of
inflation.'
Inevitably, those candidates who raise and spend the most
money are those who are elected to office."
This reality

overwhelmingly favors incumbents who repeatedly raise and spend more
money than their challengers;' 23 since 1974 the rate of re-election in
the Senate has exceeded eighty-five percent, while that in the House has
exceeded eighty-nine percent."
As costs have increased, candidates have become more dependent

upon wealthy supporters who have been able to subvert some of the
reforms left undisturbed by the Court. The 1979 amendments allowed
state and local money to be raised and spent for party building activities,
and increasingly this money has been channeled into federal election
campaigns. This so-called soft money loophole has undermined the
federal contribution limitations and disclosure requirements of the 1974
reforms."z Furthermore, the influence of special interest PACs has
increased dramatically since 1974, easily representing fifty percent or
more of the contributions to the campaign coffers of members of
Congress,26 usually incumbents who are already influential players in

120. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 264 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
121. Marty Jezer, et al., A Proposalfor DemocraticallyFinancedCongressionalElections, 11
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 333, 336 (1993). See also Neidert, supra note 76, at 294. Between 1982
and 1992, spending increased almost seven hundred percent. Raskin, supra note 3, at 326. The
extent of expenditures, of course is relative, and campaign expenditures may not seem too far out
of line compared with corporate advertising budgets. Roy A. Schotland, Proposalsfor Campaign
Finance Reform: An Article Dedicatedto Being Less Dull Than Its Title, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 429,
444 (1992).
122. Jezer, supra note 119, at 338.
123. George S. Mitrovich, PublicFunding of Elections: Money and the Politics of Betrayal, 57
VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 435, 436 (May 1, 1991); Real Campaign Reform Must Contain Key
Essential Elements, COMMON CAUSE NEws (Common Cause, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 1993;
Raskin, supra note 3, at 292. Not only are incumbents able to solicit and spend more money, unlike
their challengers they also enjoy public self-subsidies which accompany their office, such as a salary,
staff, and other expenses and privileges. Raskin, supra note 3, at 288-91.
124. See Raskin, supra note 3, at 293. See also Jezer, supra note 119, at 339.
125. H. REP. No. 375, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1993). See also Jezer, supra note 119, at
335-38; Marlene A. Nicholson, Continuing the Dialogue on CampaignFinanceReform: A Response
to Roy Schotland, 2 CAP. U. L. REV. 463, 482 (1992); Pace, supra note 38, at 145-46; Schotland,
supra note 119, at 450; Levit, supra note 87, at 494. For an expose on soft money in the 1992
elections see Josh Goldstein, Soft Money, Real Dollars:Soft Money in the 1992 Elections, CENTER
FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS (Washington, D.C.), Aug. 1993. Another technique, bundling, whereby
numerous contributions are packaged and forwarded to the candidate in the nature of a single interest
group's contribution, also subverts the contribution limits of the 1974 Act. Levit, supra note 87,
at 494 n.120.
126. See Jezer, supra note 119, at 336-40; Mitrovich, supra note 121, at 436; Raskin, supra
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the political arena."
The associational rights implicated by this
pooling of resources" should pale in comparison to the appearance of
corruption suggested by the pools.129 In a representative democracy,
a representative "should be a free agent . . . subjected to no direct
compulsion.""3 That aspirational definition may not hold true today.

If the court does not recant its position in Buckley, then Congress
should extend the Presidential public financing provisions upheld in
Buckley to Congressional elections. By doing so, Congress would
ensure that at least a candidate's total campaign expenditures, along with
expenditures from personal funds, can be capped, if not independent
expenditures.1 "' Contribution limits without spending limits enable
incumbent Congressional candidates to raise more money, spend more

money, and secure re-election.

With different financing systems for

Presidential and Congressional elections, PAC funds tend to dominate
Congressional campaigns. Both conditions suggest that public financing
should be extended to Congressional elections in order to curb special
interest group influence, equalize access to public office by all
candidates, and reduce campaign expenditures.
Many notable commentators have supported public financing for
Congressional elections, 32 and Congress has repeatedly considered
such a proposal.' 33 While opponents argue that public funding will

note 3, at 294; Stephenson-Home, supra note 5, at 555; Neidert, supra note 76, at 296. See also
Larry Makinson & Joshua Goldstein, Open Secrets: The Encyclopedia of CongressionalMoney and
Politics, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE PoLrrIcs (Washington, D.C.). However, while the registration
of PACs has increased as well, not all are active in each election cycle. Lee Ann Elliott, The Facts
andFigures About CampaignFinance: A View From Insidethe FederalElection Commission, 8 J.L.
& POL'Y 311, 311 (1992).
127. Mitch McConnell, CampaignFinanceReform: A Senator's Perspective, 8 J.L. & POL'Y
333, 336 (1992). For a discussion of the role of PACs and the purchase of access to the political
arena see Kenneth C. Smurzynski, Note, Modeling Campaign Contributions: The Marketfor Access
and Its Implicationsfor Regulation, 80 GEO. L.J. 1891 (1992).
128. See William T. Mayton, Politics, Money, Coercionand the Problem With CorporatePACs,
29 EMORY L.J. 375 (1980) (individuals who contribute to corporate PACs are not uniting to advance
common goals but blindly contributing to a candidate chosen by the corporation).
129. Welch, supra note 5, at 1347-48.
130.

JEREMIAH WHIPPLE JENKS & RUFUS DANIEL SMITH, WE AND OUR GOVERNMENT 125

(1922).
131. The Buckley Court suggested in a footnote that Congress could condition the acceptance
of public funds on an agreement by the candidate to abide by expenditure limitations as in the
Presidential campaign financing scheme. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 n.65 (1976).
132. See BROOKS JACKSON, HONEST GRAFr (1988); Jezer, supra note 119, at 345-59; Daniel
H. Lowenstein, On Campaign FinanceReform: The Root ofAll Evil Is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 301, 351-60 (1989); Wright, supra note 76, at 643.
133. Publicly funded Congressional elections almost became a part of the reforms enacted in the
early 1970s. In 1973, in a last ditch effort to secure campaign finance reform that session, several
Senators attached a rider to a supposedly veto-proof debt ceiling extension bill which provided for
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entrench incumbents, that result has not occurred in past Presidential
elections; since 1976 only one incumbent, President Reagan, has secured
re-election." 3 Public financing will reduce the amount of time and
money a candidate must spend on fundraising activities, freeing those

resources for use in more substantive enterprises.' 35 Public financing
should also reduce the overall costs of elections because of the
permissible expenditure limitations136 which constitutionally may
accompany public subsidation. 37 Finally, public financing should
return integrity to the elections process. Since public funding was
extended to Presidential elections, no candidate has been tainted by a
fundraising scandal. 3 '
B. Economic Rationalizationsfor Public Financing
Aside from conventional political rhetoric and policy arguments,
public financing of Congressional elections may be rationalized under
economic public goods theory. The issue may be analyzed according to

public financing of Congressional elections. The bill as amended passed the Senate. 119 CONG.
REC. 38172 (1973). The House, however, was unwilling to accept the Senate Amendment, and
adopted a resolution which returned the bill to the Senate in its original form. 119 CONG. REC.
38680 (1973). Eventually, a filibuster in the House killed the rider and the debt extension bill
passed without the public financing provisions. 119 CONG. REc. 39178-79 (1973). See generally
House Action Key to Allen Victory, Killing Campaign Reform 31 CONG. Q. WKLY REP. 3178 (1973);
Debt-CeilingBill Enacted Without CampaignReform, 31 CONG. Q. WKLY REp. 3177 (1973). Such
proposals were also considered in conjunction with the ultimate passage of the 1974 reform package.
See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text. Currently, both the House and Senate proposed
reform bills include public subsidies. See infra notes 197-212 and accompanying text.
134. Before 1976, the last incumbent President to lose his bid for re-election was Herbert
Hoover in 1932. Neidert, supra note 76, at 302, n.101.
135. See Jezer, supra note 119, at 349, n.74.
136. Frank J. Donatelli, Regulating the Political Marketplace, 8 J.L. & POL'Y 249, 250-51
(1992). But see McConnell, supra note 125, at 334. Immediately after the enactment of the 1974
Amendments, presidential general election spending decreased and PAC contributions, as a
percentage of total receipts, decreased as well. Rhodes Cook, PublicFinancingAlters Presidential
Politics, 37 CONG. Q. WKLY REP. 2227 (1979).
137. See supra note 129. However, conditioning receipt of public funds upon a candidate's
agreement to relinquish the Constitutional right to spend unlimited funds on a campaign may still
violate the Constitution. The doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions" suggests that the government
may not grant a benefit contingent upon the relinquishment of a constitutional right. For a
discussion of this doctrine, see Richard A. Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State
Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L. REV, 4 (1988); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1989). See also Levit, supra note 87, at
478-86.
138. Larry Harrington, Should the Public Funding of PresidentialCampaigns Be Abolished?,
8 J.L. & POLITICs 321, 321 (1992). Furthermore, the estimated cost of public funding pales in
comparison to the cost of the Savings and Loan fiasco, which arguably was more expensive because
of Congressional liaisons with industry juggernauts. See Stephen Pizzo, Public Financing (the
Cheaper Solution), MOTHER JONES, Jan/Feb. 1994, at 21; Raskin, supra note 3, at 202.
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three theories of public goods and the state: (1) the Neo-Classical theory
of public goods, (2) the Conventional theory, and (3) the Neo-Marxist
theory of the state.
If one views public financing of elections as the purchase of political
information about the candidates and issues, then under Neo-Classical
theory public funding can be rationalized on a pure public goods
basis.139 Political information is non-rival in consumption:
one
knowing it does not detract from another knowing it. In other words,
consumption of political information is indivisible since one person's
consumption does not diminish the amount available for other citizens.
Furthermore, this good is not subject to the exclusion principle as are
private goods, since those persons who are unwilling to pay for political
information cannot be excluded from the benefits of its provision. Thus,
attempts at exclusion would be inefficient and would result in afree rider
problem whereby individual preferences for information would be
difficult to determine and allocate.
Therefore campaigns, like voter registration programs and polling
places, are an integral part of the electoral process and should be viewed
as a public good and publicly funded. All citizens should subsidize and
support the electoral process in a country with democratic political
institutions, wherein the exclusion principle is economically inoperable,
and wherein all citizens benefit not only from the acquisition of political
information, but from the fruits of the labor of those candidates who
ultimately are elected."
By another analysis, clean elections, defined
as those without special interest influence or the incumbency advantages
of substantial contributions and expenditures, that is, elections where
everyone competes on the basis of merit, may be viewed as a merit
good. The desirability of a truly representative electoral process should
override concerns about interference with the individual preferences of
citizens who do not wish to use their money to support certain parties or
candidates. After all, the goal of publicly financed elections is not
simply to support the campaigns of individual candidates, but those of all
candidates, that is, the whole electoral process.141

139. See generally RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEoGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE (1984).

140. David G. Davies, PoliticalCampaigns: Publicv. Private Financing,3 GOV'T FIN. 9 (Aug.
1974). Of course there are some private aspects to campaigning. The candidate benefits from the
resources of the office, which, if skillfully employed, may lead to re-election and consequently to
the advantages of incumbency: more salary, higher retirement benefits, higher honoraria, and more
power and prestige through committee assignments, chairmanships and other important
appointments. Id.
141. Id.
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Of course, public policy, determined by a group decision made in
the political market, must dictate the appropriate quantity to be consumed
of any public good. Conventional theory, or the pluralist elite model of
democracy, postulates that the citizen's choice for public goods reigns
through the elected representatives in the political market. It follows
then, that if citizens favored publicly financed campaigns, then their
representative should reflect that choice in legislative enactments.
However, while the public supported public funding for both Presidential
and Congressional elections prior to the enactment of the 1974
Amendments, Congress chose to fund only Presidential campaigns.142
Moreover, even the support for Presidential public financing may be
more oral than substantive. In 1974 only fifteen percent of taxpayers
used the dollar income tax check-off.14 3 The percentage of tax returns
checked "yes" peaked at twenty-eight percent in 1980 and subsequently
has declined gradually to below eighteen percent in 1992.1" Perhaps
citizen preferences are not transformed into legislative enactments.
On the other hand, since public goods theory emerged in response
to private economic market failures, it seems plausible that political
markets will fail as well. One explanation for such a failure is the
absence of an informed public. Some voters cynically equate support for
political campaigns as being tantamount to support for corruption instead
of its cure."'4 Arguably if the public was aware that pubic financing
was a constitutional prerequisite to the imposition of spending limits,
more citizens would embrace the check-off system. 46 Suggestions for
improving the public's understanding and support of the system include
public service television advertisements 14 and an automatic check-off
unless the taxpayer specifically declines."'

142. David Adamy, Public Financing: A Cure for the Curse of Slush Funds, 37 THE
PROGRESSIVE 38, 38 (Oct. 1973).
143. Should the Taxpayers Footthe Billfor Elections?, 252 THE ECONOMIST 27, 27 (Aug. 10,
1974).
144. Pace, supra note 38, at 140. This decline threatened the solvency of the fund because the
dollar check-off is not indexed to inflation, whereas the amount paid to candidates from the fund is
so indexed. Id. at 147. See also Rhodes Cook, CampaignFund FacesShortfall as More Taxpayers
Check No, 49 CONG. Q. WKLY REP. 558 (1991). As a result Congress has increased the amount
of the check-off threefold. See 26 U.S.C. § 6096 (Supp. 1993)).
145. Pace, supra note 38, at 141-42.
146. See Glen Craney, Public Cashfor PresidentialBids Could Be in Jeopardy, 47 CONG. Q.
WKLY REP. 2326, 2328 (1989).
147. Brooks Jackson, Repeal PublicFinancing?Don 'tMake Me Laugh, 8 J.L. & POLITICS 325,
328 (1992). The Federal Election Commission inaugurated a limited awareness campaign in 1991.
See Cook, supra note 142, at 559.
148. Craney, supra note 144, at 2328. Such an idea seems desirable given theincreased number
of returns prepared by professionals. Id.
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A second explanation for the lack of support for public financing
relates to the fact that the wealth of special interest groups and to some
extent, that of individuals, distort citizen choice in the political market
by influencing the outcome of elections.' 4 9 This situation leads to two
major anti-democratic effects, so-called multiple voting and multiple
representation. Both multiple voting and multiple representation operate
to the benefit of wealthy contributors and interest groups, and to the
detriment of voters unwilling or unable to contribute or organize. 5 °
Multiple voting occurs when money is translated into additional votes
which in turn leads to multiple representation, whereby the interests of
financial supporters dominate the choices of representatives."' As a
result, the principle of one man, one vote is undermined, along with
the progress previously made by the elimination of property
qualifications for voters and the poll tax.153
Furthermore, the concept of democracy presumes that all citizens
have equal access to the political arena; yet the current system
discriminates against non-incumbents and citizens who do not have equal
access to the wealth that is necessary for an effective campaign. The
result is that organization of political life into special interest
constituencies may eliminate some public values from political
consideration."M Public financing, which could diminish the barriers
to entry fortified by wealth, represents a feasible solution to this failure
in the political market.' 55
Yet while public financing could alleviate the current discrimination
in gaining access to the political process, spheres of influence may shift
from wealth-based forms to other, equally prejudicial forms. Political
purchasing power also includes direct expenditures of energy in
campaigning and organizing,' 56 that is active conduct marshalled for a

149. See C.B. MACPHEARSON, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 87 (1977).
150. See Marlene A. Nicholson, Campaign Financingand EqualProtection,26 STAN. L. REV.
815, 819-21 (1974).
151. Id.
152. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). This case launched the reapportionment doctrine
under the one man, one vote principle. For a discussion of the reapportionment cases see Leventhal,
supra note 1, at 347-54.
153. The constitution provides that "The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any
primary or other election for President or Vice-President, or for Senator or Representative in
Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state by reason of failure to
pay any poll tax or other tax." U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1. This prohibition was made
applicable to the States as well. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
154. GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 6 (1966).
155. See Raskin, supra note 3, at 277-79.
156. MacPherson, supra note 147, at 87.
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candidate. 57
Participation in the electoral process comes
disproportionately from upper status groups.'58 Therefore, time and
interest, as well as wealth, are unequally distributed sources of political
influence so that even if the influence of wealth is reduced, political
markets might still fail." 9 Nevertheless, it seems doubtful that they
would fail as dismally, and public financing, coupled with the regulation
of expenditures, should help level the playing field, just as insider
trading laws help level the playing field of the securities market."W
The need for public subsidation of campaigns can also be explained
and rationalized by Neo-Maxist theory. This theory describes a distorted
democratic ideology that is characteristic of capitalist society, which
contains two antagonistic elements: liberalism, the political ideology that
underwrites the state's role in fostering capital accumulation, and
democracy, the principle of participation and equality that legitimizes the
state. 6 1 Thus, the state serves a dual purpose. On the one hand, it
facilitates the accumulation of capital by safeguarding the specific
interests of capitalists, whether they are interests of big business or labor,
industry, the scientific community involved in research and development,
or any other structure indispensable to the capitalist economy. At the
same time, the state is a mystification, an institution which portrays itself
as serving the nation as a whole so that class antagonisms are obscured
and the populace remains confident that the state is responsive to its
needs. So then, the state protects the parochial interests of capitalists in
their pursuit of private accumulation, yet transcends those specific
elements to legitimize the social order.
The electoral process reflects the antagonism between these two
elements of the capitalist state, liberalism and democracy. The state
must expend funds to assure both accumulation and legitimization. One

157. For an argument that expenditures of money are merely a surrogate for expenditures of
effort see supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
158. Carlton W. Sterling, Private Financing of Campaign: Equality Against Freedom, 62
A.B.A. J. 198 (Feb. 1976).
159. Also, if political participation is shifted from an emphasis on wealth to an expenditure of
energy, one effect may be an increase in the influence of unions or professional associations via their
non-cash contributions of staff time, for example, through members who are assigned to work in
campaigns, as well as through telephone and various other support services. When the House
Administration Committee rejected public financing of Congressional campaigns, it expressed a
concern over such a shift from the exercise of power by one type of special interest group to
another. H.R. REP. No. 1239, 93d Cong., 2nd Sess. 13-14 (1974).
160. For a discussion of insider trading prohibitions see generally Carpenter v. United States,
484 U.S. 19 (1987); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222
(1980).
161. See generally ALAN WOLFE, THE LiMITS OF LEGITIMACY 7 (1977).
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category of social expenses are those necessary to maintain social
harmony. 62 Public financing of campaigns may be viewed as such an
expense. It is an effort by the state to re-assert it universality and
thereby legitimize itself. The dialectical functions of the state have
resulted in alienated politics; as a result, citizen participation and
emotional involvement in American elections has declined.1 63 By
providing for public funding of campaigns, the state may be able to claim
that the electoral process has been cleansed of the taint of the influence
exercised by special interests, that an individual's vote is meaningful:
democracy is golden and the state legitimate. Thus, the threat of an
alienated electorate, which may respond to that alienation by
undermining the capitalist system rather than by reforming elections,
would be circumvented.
Certain provisions of election reform reflect the dialectical nature of
the capitalist state. The treatment of minor and new party Presidential
candidates under the 1974 Amendments evidences the desire of the state
to insure the legitimization of the present framework of the political
system. "
Under the Act's formula, minor party candidates for
President receive a substantially smaller amount than the major party
contenders. 6 So while public financing appears to render the electoral
process more democratic, it in effect replicates the present structure"
and limits open debate and access by all actors in the system.

162. See generally JAMES O'CONNOR, THE FiscAL CRisis OF THE STATE 7 (1973).
163. Wolfe, supra note 159, at 302. A study conducted for the Committee for the Study of the
American Electorate in 1976 supports this analysis. It discovered that sixty percent of non-voters
cited "attitudinal" reasons for not voting. The most frequent replies were "just don't want to," "not
interested in politics," and "there aren't any good candidates." HearingsBefore the Senate Comm.
on Rules andAdministration, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 330 (1977). Over forty percent of the electorate
did not vote in the 1976 elections; over fifty-one percent of African Americans did not vote, while
68.2% of Hispanics failed to exercise their franchise. Id. at 63.
164. In its report on the bill which provided for matching funds for Presidential primary
candidates, the SenateRules and Administration Committee acknowledged that third party candidates
would be at a disadvantage vis a' vis the major party candidates under the grant formula, but
rationalized that the bill would have "a cohesive effect, encouraging different factions to compute
and work out coalitions within the framework of a basic two party system." S. REP. No. 689, 93d
Cong., 2nd Sess. 8 (1974).
165. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. Understandably, the Libertarian Party
lobbied against the reform measures during the hearings. HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Election
of the House Comm. on House Administration, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1973).
166. Justice Rehnquist in Buckley concluded that the legislation "enshrined the Republican and
Democratic Parties in a permanently preferred position." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 293-94
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief Justice Burger concluded that the
scheme invidiously discriminated against minor parties. Id. at 251 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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However, qualifying tests indeed may be truly democratic in that
they favor those candidates who can demonstrate popular support before
subsidation begins.167 If a reasonable proportion of costs are defrayed
by public assistance, then the remainder can be raised on a grass roots
basis with less reliance on special interest support. Third party
candidates have received substantial subsidies under the program."
This fact counsels against the proposition that the present public
financing system is aimed at entrenchment, and instead suggests that
public financing represents a more balanced approach.
C. Suggestions for Reform
While public financing of Congressional elections can be justified
politically and economically, how can such a system be financed? Tax
incentives are one method whereby the government could partially
finance campaigns. The 1971 Revenue Act provided incentives for
political contributions of a moderate size: a fifty percent tax credit could
be received for total contributions up to $12.50 per person, or a
deduction could be taken for contributions up to $50 per person. 69
The practice of permitting tax credits and deductions from taxable
income for public interest reasons is well established. Deductions for
contributions to charitable and religious organizations are justified as
being an incentive to use income in a meritorious form, or to encourage
expenditures that generate benefits. Support of the electoral process can
be viewed along these lines as well so that the re-implementation of such
measures, along with an increase in the amounts previously allowed,
could be justified as a desirable, indirect method of publicly subsidizing
Congressional elections.
Tax incentives are advantageous for several reasons. First, they
circumvent the problem of governmental allocation of funds, which is
present when the government appropriates money from the federal purse.
Thus, formulas for major and minor party candidates would not need to
be devised. Secondly, through tax incentives the government refrains
from directly interfering with an individual's preference. The taxpayer
is not only free to choose whether or not to support candidates for office,

167. Sterling, supra note 156, at 199.
168. See Daniel Seligman, The David Duke Support Fund, FORTUNE, Jan. 27, 1992, at 116.
169. Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 41, 85 Stat. 497, 560-61, repealed by
Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 113, 92 Stat. 2763, 2778 (deduction provision) and
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 112, 100 Stat. 2085, 2108 (credit provision). The
statute had been amended previously in 1975 to double the then allowable deductions and credits.
Act of Jan. 3, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-625, § 12, 88 Stat. 2108, 2120 (repealed).
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but is equally free to choose which candidate or party is to receive his
or her contribution. Thirdly, the taxpayer may withdraw support from
candidates and parties at will when he or she becomes disenchanted, and
transfer that support to other candidates or parties. 170
There are also disadvantages to using credits'7 1 and deductions,
which implicate the very reason for turning to public subsidation in the
first place. The amount of tax savings a taxpayer can realize through
deductions depends upon the individual's tax bracket: the higher the
bracket, the greater the savings. Thus, deductions discriminate against
those taxpayers of limited financial resources who pay little or no taxes,
or who use the standard deduction; hence, the situation arises again
whereby the wealthy who benefit most from deductions will have the
most incentive to contribute, and through their contributions, to influence
the political process.
A better case can be made for tax credits than for deductions. 72
A tax credit of a flat amount affects all taxpayers equally, and therefore
does not inherently discriminate in favor of the wealthy contributor.
Whether or not the less wealthy take advantage of these credits to a
significant degree, and whether or not sufficient funds could be raised in
this manner without adverse impact on the tax system, certainly merits
serious consideration.
Tax incentives could not underwrite the entire effort alone and
would need to be supplemented by other, perhaps more ambitious,
creative and even more controversial measures.
Other tax-based
proposals include repealing the tax deduction for special interest
lobbying,173 and taxing the campaign chests of candidates who refuse
to comply with the expenditure limits that would accompany public
financing. 74 The public funds dedicated to funding the national
conventions should be diverted to the funding of Congressional
campaigns in order to augment the available funds as well. Currently,
the conventions are dinosaurs and watched by probably fewer people than
any other major media event. Political parties should seize the
opportunity to exploit the current public interest in news magazine

170. See Davies, supra note 138, at 12.
171. See Lowenstein, supra note 130, at 364-65 (tax credits are an inefficient financing
alternative); Nicholson, supra note 123, at 483-84 (benefits of tax credits would accrue to the
sophisticated and affluent).
172. See Schotland, supra note 119, at 461. Currently eight states use tax credits to support
public financing of elections. Chi, supra note 5, at 287.
173. Common Cause News, supra note 121, at 5.
174. Levit, supra note 87, at 500 (discussion of pending legislation). Such a penalty might
implicate the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. See supra note 135.

99

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

WINTER 1995

shows, and re-package their conventions for the twenty-first century. In
so doing, advertising revenues, together with network bidding, should be
able to underwrite a new, informative, and relevant convention
format.1 75
Finally, a National Clean Congressional Campaign
Sweepstakes, with all proceeds benefitting the Make Democracy Work
Fund is another option. 76
This euphemistically denominated
177
lottery
could be easily implemented through an optional tax checkoff system, whereby either the amount of taxes owed could be increased,
or the amount of the refund decreased, by a specific amount. 78 The
perceived evils of a lottery would be avoided because each taxpayer
could enter only once a year, and the program could be easily
coordinated through the computerized selection of a social security
number. If the program was sufficiently publicized, unlike the current
check-off system, 179 the funds generated could be substantial.
Such fairly painless revenue raising measures might be adequate to
fund Congressional races if the campaigns were publicly produced. If
the government chooses to finance campaigns, it may render support
either by funding private efforts or by producing election campaigns by
providing certain services to candidates. Theoretically, it should be
economically more efficient to-provide certain services than to provide
money for their purchase. Congress could extend the frank to all
candidates for federal office, provide for a limited number of free or
reduced rate mailings of campaign materials, or publish a voter's
information pamphlet, in which space is made available to each candidate
to advocate views and which is subsequently mailed to all registered
voters. "
Since the biggest increase in campaign costs can be attributed to the
rising use and cost of the broadcast media,'8 1 the provision of this

175. See Campaign Finance, 8 J.L. & PouTIcs 291, 309 (1992); Harrington, supra note 136,
at 324.
176. This fund was established under the most recent House reform proposal, but not funded.
H.R. 3, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. § 701 (1993). See infra notes 194-212 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the proposed legislation.
177. Why not analogize the contribution to a charitable contribution since the money is
specifically earmarked for the purchase of a public good? See supra text accompanying notes 13739.
178. If no taxes were owed, nor a refund due, the taxpayer should be allowed to enter the
sweepstakes separately one time by paying the specified amount.
179. See supra notes 141-146 and accompanying text.
180. For a discussion of these and similar proposals see Jezer, supra note 119, at 353. See also
Myles V. Lynk, Regulating Political Activity: Notes on a Hypothetical Statute to Regulate
PresidentialPrimary and General Election Campaigns, 8 J.L. & POLITICS 259, 265-66 (1992)
(reduced mail rates facilitate the flow of information to the public).
181. Nicholson, supra note 148, at 852.
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resource must be of paramount importance. Broadcasters are statutorily
licensed to use the spectrum in the "public interest, convenience, and
necessity. " '
This privilege, along with its commensurate burden,
which is justified by the alleged scarcity of the airways,' has allowed
Congress through the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to
regulate the industry more pervasively than would be constitutionally
permissible with respect to the print media.'
For years the FCC
enforced the Fairness Doctrine," 5 which required broadcasters to
devote a reasonable percentage of time to the fair and balanced coverage
of public issues.Y16 Although the FCC has abandoned the Doctrine,
which was not codified in the Communications Act of 19341" nor
constitutionally required,st nothing suggests that Congress could not
formally enact the doctrine to enhance political dialogue." 9 In fact,
federal law requires licensed broadcasters who allow candidates for
public office to appear on their station to afford equal opportunities to
other such candidates." Furthermore, federal law also provides that

182. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a).
183. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). See also FCC v. League of
Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (spectrum scarcity requires that licensed
broadcasters serve in some sense as public fiduciaries for the presentation of views). For a critique
of the scarcity justification for regulation see Telecommunications Research and Action Center v.
FCC. 801 F. 2d 501, reh'g denied, 806 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919
(1987).
184. Compare FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (FCC may regulate broadcasts
containing indecent language) with Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (states may only ban
printed material which meets the Constitutional definition of being obscene). See also Capital
Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.C. Cir. 1971), aff'dwithout opinion, 415 U.S.
1000 (1972) (statute which made it unlawful to advertise cigarettes on any medium of electronic
communication held to be constitutional).
185. The Fairness Doctrine was formally announced by the FCC in Report on Editorializing,
13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949).
186. For example, prior to the statutory ban on cigarette advertisements, the FCC required
stations which ran cigarette commercials to present some information concerning health risks
associated with smoking. That ruling was upheld in Banzhafv. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
187. Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC, 801 F. 2d 501 (D.C. Cir 1986),
cert denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987).
188. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir 1989).
189. After the FCC eliminated the Doctrine, Congress passed the Fairness in Broadcasting Act
of 1987 to ensure that broadcasters afforded reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting
views of public importance. S. 742, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). However, President Reagan
vetoed the bill. Of course, such a doctrine could not constitutionally be applied to the print media.
See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding state statute that
required newspaper to grant political candidate the right to reply to criticism was unconstitutional).
190. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1988). Providing response time, however, is not required if the
candidate merely appeared in a legitimate newscast, interview, documentary, or news event covered
on-the-spot. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1)-(4) (1988). For an explanation of what constitutes a news event
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the FCC may revoke a broadcaster's license for failure to permit the
purchase of reasonable amounts of time by legally qualified
candidates.19' This latter statutory mandate has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court as creating an affirmative, promptly enforceable right of
access for political candidates, and not just a general duty to provide
political programming."
Thus, there is ample precedent to suggest that Congress could
require broadcasters to make free time available to Congressional
candidates, or at least to make time available at substantially reduced
rates. 1 Many commentators support the idea of expanding the access
of political candidates to the broadcast media." A publicly supported
reduced rate for such access may be more analogous to public provision
than to public production. In theory the public owns rights in the
airways as a natural resource; in reality private affiliations operate them.
Nevertheless, if governmental intrusion of this sort is acceptable with
respect to the broadcast media, perhaps other heavily regulated
enterprises, like the transportation and communications industries, may

to which the requirement does not apply see Kennedy for President Committee v. FCC, 636 F.2d
432 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
191. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1988). A legally qualified candidate is one who has publicly
announced an intention to run, is qualified under the applicable law to run, and has met other
appropriate qualifications. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1940(a) (1992).
192. Columbia Broadcasting System v. FCC, 453 U.S. 365 (1981). The duty can be fulfilled
by either allotting free time to candidates or by selling the time at statutorily prescribed rates as set
forth in 47 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1988). Kennedy for President Committee v. FCC, 636 F.2d 417 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
193. Wright, supra note 76, at 644. During Congress' consideration of the 1974 Amendments,
Representatives John Anderson and Morris Udall offered a bill providing for voter's time, which
made available free television use in large blocks of time to candidates. H.R. 7612, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973). The purpose was two-fold: to provide subsidation to candidates via free access to the
broadcast media and to substitute large blocks of time to be used for a discussion of the issues
instead of the Madison Avenue approach of spot advertising. Network representatives lobbied
heavily against the proposal arguing that administration would be impractical since broadcast areas
often encompass several overlapping Congressional districts. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Elections of the House Comm. on House Adrmnistration, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 482 (1973). Many
other countries allow political candidates or parties free television and radio exposure. See e.g.
Michael J. Baker, A Constitutional Remedy for the Higher Cost of Broadcast and Newspaper
Advertising in Political Campaigns, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1371, 1405 (1972); Lech Garlicki, Some
ComparisonsInspiredBy ProfessorHogan'sRemarks: CampaignRegulation in Poland,21 CAP. U.
L. REv. 555, 563-66 (1992); Hogan, supra note 111, at 508-513.
194. See e.g., Louis Harris, Reform Now! S. 100 and Beyond, 8 J.L. & PoLITIcs 253, 255-56
(1992); Paul Taylor, Improving PoliticalDiscourse:A Five Minute Fix, 8 J.L. & PoLirIcs 283, 283
(1992); Jezer, supra note 119, at 354; Lynk, supra note 178, at268-69. But see Robert M. O'Neil,
FirstAmendment Issue In S. 100, 8 J.L. & PoLITIcs 277, 280 (1992); Schotland, supra note 119,
at 451 n.48.
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be conduits for publicly subsidized, reduced rate support for
candidates.195

D. The Current CongressionalProposal
Perhaps in response to the housecleaning election of 1992, both the
Senate and the House passed campaign reform bills in 1993.111
President Clinton has expressed support for campaign reform,"o9 and
now the focus is on the conference committee, which must reconcile the
two differing bills." 9 Key items of both bills include spending limits,
publicly financed benefits for complying candidates, and tailored
restrictions on PACs and independent expenditures.
The House bill limits expenditures per campaign to $600,000.199
However, the limits are not applicable if an opponent raises or spends in
excess of twenty-five percent of the limit."
The Senate bill limits
expenditures between a range of $1.6 to 8.9 million for both general and
primary elections, depending upon a formula which takes into account

the number of voters."0

The Senate bill caps expenditures from a

candidate's personal funds at $25,000,'

while the House bill caps

such spending at $50,000.

195. If passes somehow could be made available to qualified candidates on previously scheduled
military transport, then such a service could be characterized as being publicly produced rather than
being publicly provided, and as such, should be less expensive.
196. See H.R. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
197. Beth Donovan, ConstitutionalIssues Frame CongressionalOptions, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY
REP. 431, 431 (1993). Some observers, however, contend that the President's support is not
sufficiently enthusiastic. See Pizzo, supra note 136, at 18-19. Nevertheless if a reasonable reform
bill passes Congress it is unlikely that President Clinton will veto it. President Bush was not as
supportive of campaign reform and successfully vetoed a reform bill in 1992. See Beth Donovan,
CampaignFinance Cleanup, 50 CONG. Q. WKLY REP. 787 (1992); Beth Donovan, Senate Sustains
Veto of Overhaul Bill, 50 CONG. Q. WKLY REP. 1324 (1992).
198. See David Corn, Beltway Bandits, THE NATiON, Dec. 27, 1993, at 792. For a discussion
and comparison of the two bills, see generally Campaign Finance Bills Compared, 52 CONG. Q.
WKLY REP. 262-69 (1994); Decisions in House-Senate Conference on Campaign FinanceReform
Will Make or Break Meaningful Reform, Says Common Cause, COMMON CAUSE NEWS (Common
Cause, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 1993.
199. H.R. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §201(a) (1993). The amount can be augmented by
$200,000 if the candidate won the primary by twenty percent or less, or in the case of a runoff. Id.
at §201(b).
200. H.R. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(d)(1)(B) (1993). Certain legal, fundraising, and
accounting costs are exempt from the limits. Id. at § 201(e) & (f).
201. S. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 502(b). The Senate bill only exempts legal and accounting
costs. Id. at § 502(c).
202. S. 3., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 502(a) (1993).
203. H.R. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 602 (1993).
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These rather modest limits ' are voluntarily imposed if a
candidate desires to accept the rather modest benefits 5 provided by the

legislation, for which no corresponding revenue measures were proposed.
The House bill provides for voter communication vouchers on a
matching basis,'
while the Senate bill provides communication
discounts for postage and broadcast costs.'
Both bills allow for extra
benefits to offset spending by an opponent in excess of the limits, or to
counter independent expenditures exceeding $10,000.1
Both bills
tighten the definition of independent expenditures as well, to prevent
collusion between independent groups and the candidate's campaign, and
require broadcasters to sell candidates response time at the statutorily
prescribed rate to counter independent expenditures.'
Both bills also
set aggregate limits on PAC contributions, 20 attempt to close the soft
money loophole, 21 ' strengthen the powers of the Federal Election
Commission,2 12 and amend the statutory rate charged political
candidates by broadcasters under the Communications Act of 1934.213
Nevertheless, the reforms proposed in the two bills as a whole still may
not be sufficient to restore integrity to the elections process.214

204. The proposed expenditure caps are actually fairly comparable to the current amounts being
spent by Congressional campaign winners. Jezer, supra note 119, at 343.
205. See Raskin, supra note 3, at 332 (public funding provisions of both bills insufficient to
overcome inegalitarian features of Congressional campaigns).
206. H.R. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 604(i) (1993). These communication vouchers could be
used to purchase broadcast time, print advertisements, voter contact materials, and postage stamps.
207. S. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 503 (1993).
208. S. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 503(b) (1993); H.R. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 604(t)
(1993).
209. S. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Ses. §§ 301, 303 (1993).
210. S. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (1993) (proposed ban on PACs with substitute aggregate
limit if ban held to be unconstitutional); H.R. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (1993). Aggregate
PAC limits imposed by state law have been held to be constitutional. Gard v. Wisconsin State
Elections Bd., 456 N.W.2d 809 (Wis. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 982 (1990).
211. S. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 311-15 (1993); H.R. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., § 403
(1993). Whether or not the provisions are adequate is debatable. Jezer, supra note 119, at 344.
212. S. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 601-10 (1993); H.R. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 701-05
(1993). The investigatory enforcement powers of the FCC, in particular, need strengthening. See
Paula Dwyer, When This Watchdog Opens It's Mouth, It's Yawning, BUSINESS WEEK, June 4, 1990,
at 71. See also Kenneth A. Gross, The Enforcement of Campaign Finance Rules: A System in
Search of Reform, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 279 (1991) (asserting that Congress must improve the
enforcement of federal campaign finance laws).
213. The change was made in part in response to a need for the statutory rate to apply to nonpreemptible time. For a discussion of this problem and FCC audit which led to the proposed
amendment see H. REP. No. 375, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 59-69 (1993).
214. Ellen Miller, Point of View: Campaign Finance Reform?, CAPITAL EYE (Center for
Responsive Politics, Washington, D.C.), May 1, 1994, at 7; Corn, supra note 196, at 792.

FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT

V. Conclusion
So who is running twenty years after the Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendments of 1974? The situation still appears to be status quo,
wherein the same types of candidates, who are bankrolled by the same
or similar interest groups, still seek and secure election to office. The
one preeminent exception to this rule, a candidate who was not so
bankrolled, epitomizes the important role that money plays in political
campaigns - Ross Perot.
The Supreme Court should recant its position in Buckley, given the
still pervasive and inequitable distortions which dominate federal
Congressional campaigns, and free Congress to fashion the appropriate
comprehensive reforms. While a reversal of Buckley would allow
expenditure limits without public financing provisions, such subsidation,
nevertheless, is a most desirable reform measure. Public financing can
not only be rationalized from a policy standpoint, but it also can be
explained under various economic theories of public goods. While
Congress must be creative in appropriating funds for such a justifiable
endeavor, that task is not insurmountable. Unfortunately the current
proposal appears to be a bandaid when, in fact, surgery is needed.
Perhaps twenty-five years after the 1974 Amendments the situation will
be different. Such a goal is certainly one well worth pursuing.

